Luis de Guindos: Interview with El País

3 May 2026

The ECB has had to take more action than was expected when you became Vice-President in 2018. Would you say that you came in as a hawk [with a more orthodox approach] and have gradually softened your stance? And was that out of conviction or owing to the severity of events?

I think I’ve been in the middle. In Bloomberg’s ranking of hawks and doves [more inclined to looser policy], for example, I’m in the middle. Yes, I was more of a hawk before, in 2022, I was one of the first to make the case that we would need to raise rates and that inflation was more persistent than we had been saying. After peaking at 10%, inflation then fell back to 2%. Now, at the end of my time here, I would say that I lean more towards prudence.

What does that mean exactly?

It means recognising that the current situation is very different from 2021 or 2022. Back then, in addition to the shock caused by the pandemic and the reopening of the economy, we had extremely expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.

Fiscal policy is expansionary now, too.

But the euro area budget deficit rose to 7% back then. The ECB injected €2 trillion into the banking sector and bought bonds worth around another €2 trillion. And we had negative interest rates. The series of shocks that led to inflation was very different from what we are seeing today. We are now in the midst of a geopolitical conflict and we have to keep a cool head. That’s why I fully agree with Thursday’s decision [to wait to decide on an interest rate hike]. It would be a mistake to apply what happened in 2021-22 to the current situation, but there is also a huge level of uncertainty and it’s important to reach a consensus.

How do you see the Spanish economy in this environment?

In economics, we sometimes forget that when energy prices rise, the effect on inflation shows up in the indicators faster than the effect on economic growth. The impact of the war wasn’t yet reflected in the data for the first quarter, for Europe as a whole or for Spain, but forward-looking indicators are starting to show that it is going to have a strong impact. Confidence, for example, has deteriorated very significantly.

Do you think Spain is guilty of being too optimistic?

Governments have to be optimistic and it’s important to convey that kind of message. The macroeconomic figures for Spain are good, although there are ultimately all the different nuances to consider: income per capita, productivity, the housing problem… More could have been done to reduce the budget deficit, but the Spanish economy has two very positive things going for it: a financial system that is not a cause for concern and the fact that it is a competitive economy. It is well prepared for a slowdown, which will be clear and marked, because Spain cannot escape this environment.

Much of the uncertainty you mention has to do with Donald Trump. He was US President when you started your term and, against all odds, he’s back once again when you are coming to the end of it. Do you think, like Mark Carney said in Davos, that the old world order has ceased to exist or is there a way to mend it?

The world is very, very different to the world of eight years ago, and we don’t need to go back much further. In Europe, we have finally understood that we need to be more independent. And that starts with defence, but it is widening to everything else. For example, everything to do with technology, means of payment, the cloud and artificial intelligence. The old rules no longer apply. The world has stopped taking the multilateral approach to problems that it used to, even though back then there were also some diverging opinions and national points of view. But the overall approach was one of cooperation. For Europe, this is a hugely important wake-up call. The new US Administration represents a paradigm shift, not only for tariffs, but also for banking regulation or crypto-assets, for example. Europe’s defence has been in the hands of the United States since practically the end of the Second World War, and that sense of protection the United States gave us in terms of defence is gradually disappearing.

There is some consensus that the answer should be a more united Europe, with a truly common market, but there are still lots of barriers. For example, in terms of cross-border bank consolidation, like what is happening at the moment with the Italian bank UniCredit’s takeover bid for the German bank Commerzbank. There is talk of technical problems, like the lack of a common deposit insurance scheme, but isn’t it more a matter of political, nationalist resistance?

I am more worried about the structural and political nationalism that we now see in national parliaments, as we have always had those other national interests in specific situations. The main problem for European integration is the presence of populist movements in national settings and in the European Parliament itself. There was one in Hungary that has now faded, but it seems like another is emerging on the other side in Bulgaria. On the specific transaction being discussed, we have provided the ECB’s response to the European Commission’s consultation for its report on the competitiveness of the banking sector, and we make the case for something that is very clear: the euro area needs to be a single jurisdiction for European banks, with capital and liquidity allowed to flow completely freely. Specific transactions each have their own characteristics, but we have always been in favour of cross-border consolidation.

And is the European Union ready for euro bonds?

The first joint debt issuance occurred as part of the Next Generation EU programme. This issuance had a huge impact on economic sentiment at a particularly difficult time, when confidence was very low. In these matters it’s important to remain pragmatic while simultaneously taking steps in the right direction.

What does that mean in concrete terms?

For example, I believe that when it comes to defence spending, it is very important to have joint financing. There is a clear objective there, and there is also an opportunity because it is a European public good. We have the Next Generation EU funds, which is already a small step in the right direction. With defence, we can take another small step, and that is how we should continue to make progress.

The United States plans to ease capital requirements for its banks, which has sparked criticism from the banking sector in Europe about the rules of play.

European banks’ capital levels pose no constraints in terms of credit provision or lending to the economy. At the ECB this is extremely clear to us. We haven’t had any banking incidents in Europe in recent years even though there have been some difficult situations. Solvency is very closely linked to the level of capital and liquidity in the European banking sector. That solvency is one of the few structural advantages Europe currently has, and that’s why I think it would be a mistake to lose it.

In Spain, do you think consolidation is required following BBVA’s failed takeover bid for Banco Sabadell, or is there no need from a resilience viewpoint?

I’m in favour of cross-border consolidation operations, not necessarily national ones, although in some cases they are needed as an initial stepping stone to a subsequent cross-border merger. But I think that the current levels of competition and concentration in the Spanish banking sector are very sound.

Do you think that something similar to the European Central Bank and the euro could have been created in today’s climate?

The ECB is the most exemplary model of European integration. There is a commom monetary policy and common banking supervision. It is the institution that most clearly embodies the advantages of European integration as opposed to the nationalist and populist approaches I mentioned earlier. The ECB has worked. When inflation was above 10%, Europeans expected it to return to 2%. Why? Because of the ECB’s credibility.

Were those the toughest times during your term?

From an institutional standpoint, one of Mario Draghi’s final Governing Council meetings as President was very tough [in 2019, when there was a 10 basis point cut and asset purchases were resumed], because it revealed a very significant internal division. President Lagarde has resolved that kind of division and healed those wounds. Today, the ECB’s Governing Council is much more united, and that has been thanks to President Lagarde’s efforts. There have been difficult moments since, such as the pandemic, although I believe we reacted relatively quickly to that.

As of June, Spain will no longer have a seat on the ECB Executive Board, and within a year and a half three seats will become vacant, including the President’s. Is this Spain’s opportunity, or should it look for another seat? Financial Times polls suggest that Spain’s former central bank governor Pablo Hernández de Cos [currently General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements] is the frontrunner.

The presidency would undoubtedly be the best outcome, but the most important thing is to have a seat on the Executive Board. Spain is the fourth‑largest economy in the euro area, and I am convinced it will secure a seat on the Board. It’s important to have one. Although we always need to look at things from a European perspective, all of us are influenced by national events. Pablo was a good governor, even though it’s true that it was Luis Linde and Fernando Restoy who oversaw the entire bank restructuring process. Moreover, that was the last appointment at the Banco de España agreed by consensus across the main political parties. But the ECB presidency is decided differently. It is a political matter; it is decided by the European Council, which makes sense. The politicians elected as part of a democratic system are the ones that end up making these appointments.

The populist wave has ignited a strong debate on migration across the whole of Europe and, specifically, in Spain. What do you think of the immigration regularisation process? The People’s Party (Partido Popular) has spoken out against it.

I have always been quite clear: immigration is crucial for Europe and for Spain, and I am in favour of it. I would have preferred a continuous regularisation system rather than simultaneously processing 500,000 or 600,000 people, because I think a more continuous process would prevent much of the backlash against it and avoid political controversy. However, the immigration process is essential for the Spanish economy. The economic benefits are clear. At the same time, we cannot turn a blind eye because there are costs, such as housing, and that’s why we must invest in public and social services and implement policies that help people find rented accommodation. In general, I am in favour of orderly migration flows and of addressing the related costs in order to prevent populism taking root.

What’s your take on the Partido Popular’s rivalry with Vox? What do you think would be the best way of challenging Vox?

I would like to stress that I am not affiliated with any political party, nor have I been a member of parliament – although I was a minister in a Partido Popular government – and that these opinions are my own. I have always seen the Partido Popular as a liberal‑conservative party that upholds the traditional values of liberal‑conservative parties in Europe. These include, above all, respect for minorities and institutions, the separation of powers, and, from an economic standpoint, support for markets within a social market economy with moderate taxation and fiscal responsibility. These are the values that have underpinned Europe’s development and in my view, they are the values represented by the European People’s Party and should also be represented by the Spanish Partido Popular.

There has been no shortage of rumours about your possible return to politics or your taking up a management role in the banking sector once the ECB’s cooling off period is over. What are your plans?

I will be joining the University of Comillas’ Faculty of Economics and Business Studies as Professor of European political economy, and I will also be working with the IESE Business School. I already spent six and a half years in politics. I won’t be going back to it and I won’t be moving to the banking sector.